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cause requirement in arrest cases; 2) avoiding the necessity of making
an arrest; 3) allowing an opportunity for exculpation; and 4) reducing
police lawlessness and frustration. The special benefits to be achieved
from the frisk are: 1) reducing danger to policemen, and 2) preventing crime by confiscating knives, guns, and other weapons. 33
If the Kentucky legislature sees fit to pass a stop and frisk law, it
is recommended that the best points of the New York law be combined
with the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure and the best
common law provisions found in other jurisdictions. The following
proposed statute is the result of just such a combination:
(1) A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place
whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed,
or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his
actions.34
(2) When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning
pursuant to this section and the officer reasonably believes his
safety so requires, he may frisk the suspect,35 strictly limiting
the frisk to a superficial patting down of the suspects outer
garments in search of dangerous weapons.
This writer believes that the suggested statute would be constitutionally acceptable, as the various components have already been
tested by the Supreme Court and found not to be in contravention of
the guarantees afforded by the fourth amendment. If it is enacted
and if the various local enforcement agencies carry on an intense
public relations campaign, the statute may serve to eliminate, not
cause, tension presently existing between the citizens and police.
Charles D. Weaver, Jr.

Ci ui AL LAW-CoMMERCIAL BamERY-T-E NxED FOR LEISiLAVE
REFonrw.-The national economy has exploded by phenomenal proportions in recent years. Big business and its allies are pushing national
and local economies to pinnacles of success never before experienced.
Speculating as to the cause, one will eventually give partial credit to a
nationally competitive life style which envisions material gain as the
33
34
35

Swartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CmmU.L.P. & P.S. 433 (1967).
N.Y. CODE CIm. PRoc. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1966).
MODEL CODE § 2.02(5).
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eventual goal. Yet while this spirit of competition fosters growth in the
economy, it sometimes generates corrupt methods among its practitioners, one of which is commercial bribery. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in American DistillingCo. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co.' defined
it

as follows: "The vice of conduct labeled 'commercial bribery ...

is the advantage which one competitor secures over his fellow competitors by his secret and corrupt dealings with employees or agents of
prospective purchasers." 2 Although the term commercial bribery is not
necessarily restricted to buyers, sellers, and purchasing agents, as this

definition implies, the phrase "gaining advantage over competitors via
corrupt dealings with employees or agents" reveals the essence of the
problem.
Kentucky's statutory power to cope with commercial bribery is

practically negligible. Among Kentucky's many bribery laws (dealing
mainly with public officials), only two purport to cover commercial
bribery: KRS § 435.320 makes it a misdemeanor for an employee to disclose information with the intent to aid a competitor;3 and KRS §
244.600 imposes criminal sanctions on brewers who commercially bribe
malt beverage retailers.4 The lack of penal sanctions within the general
1

American Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 104 F.2d 582 (7th Cir.
at 585.
KRS § 435.320 (1962) provides as follows:
Disclosure of information obtained during employment to aid competitor of employer.
(1) No person, having obtained or derived information from the books
of accoimt or from records, papers, plans, drawings, blueprints, research data or files belonging to, or in the custody of his employer shall
publish, circulate or in any manner disclose such information with the
intent to aid a competitor without the consent of such employer or aid
or encourage such publication, circulation or disclosure. No person, with
the intent of aiding a competitor, shall procure or bribe, or attempt to
bribe, another person to disclose information obtained in the course of
employment of such other person, or derived from the books of account,
records, papers, plans, drawings, blueprints, research data, or files belonging to the employer of another person, with intent to use, or cause
to be used, the same or the information contained therein, in competition with the employer of such other person.
(2) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to be in derogation of the provisions of KRS § 421.100, or to abridge or restrain in any
way the freedom of the press.
(3) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined
not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned
for not more than six months, or both. (1962, c. 138, §§ 1, 2, 3).
4
K1RS § 244.600 (1962) provides:
No brewer shall induce through any of the following means, any
malt beverage retailer to purchase any malt beverage products from him
to the exclusion in whole or in part of malt beverages sold or offered for
sale by other persons, if the brewer engages in the practice of using
(Continued on next page)

1939).

2 Id.
3
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area, however, is not as alarming as the fact that criminal prosecution
under the two statutes is rare and practically nonexistent.

Nevertheless, Kentucky courts have long recognized that principals
and agents owe a duty of utmost good faith in their dealings toward
each other.; The penalty for a breach of this duty, however, has been
applied only in civil as opposed to criminal liability, and has been,
imposed under common law rather than the statutory provisions.
Normally, the subject arises in the context of contract law where a
principal is seeking to rescind a contract or to obtain damages against
his agent, who, as a result of a "commercial bribe" procured from a
third party, has bound that principal to a contract.6 Again, Kentucky
decisions are devoid of common law principles dealing precisely with

this question. Thus, it becomes evident that Kentucky law is totally inadequate to deal with this increasing problem.
The proposal of the Kentucky Crime Commission "penalizes one
vho bribes or offers to bribe an employee or fiduciary with intent to
influence him in his employment or fiduciary capacity." 7 This proposal attacks only the briber. Immediately the question is asked,
'What about the bribee?" The only sanction imposed against a bribee
is KRS § 485.820,8 yet this statute does not include the secretive payment from a seller to a buyer's agent. If any law is to be effective, it
will have to include the bribee (who may solicit the bribe as actively
as any briber).
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

such means, or any of them, to such an extent as substantially to restrain or prevent transactions in malt beverages:
(1) By commercial bribery; or
(2) By offering or giving any bonus, premium or compensation to any
officer, employee or representative of the retailer; or
(3) By making or allowing any rebates or refunds to any officer, employee or representative of the retailer.
r See Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Eagle
Dist. 6Co. v. McFarland, 11 Ky. L. Rptr. 905 (1890).
Note, Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, 46
MnqN. L. REv. 599 (1962). This author suggests that the following remedies are
available to the principal against the briber and bribee:
The remedies available to the principal of the disloyal agent against the
briber are: (1) a right to rescind any contract induced by the agent as a
result of the bribe; and (2) a right to sue the briber for damages resulting from the bribe. The remedies available to the principal against
the bribee are: (1) a right to recover the amount of the bribe from the
disloyal agent; (2) a right to sue the disloyal agent for the damages
resulting from the bribe; (3) a right to dismiss the disloyal agent; and
(4) a right to withhold compensation for the agent's disloyal service.
Id. at 600.
7 1 KNrrucxY Cmum Co~NnssoN, OuTLiNE FoR PROPOSED CRuMNAL LAW
REvrsxoN
§ 1801, Comment (1968).
8
KRS § 435.320 (1962). The provisions of this statute are set out fully in
note 3, supra.
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The primary source of the Kentucky Crime Commission proposal
is Section 180.00 of the New York Penal Laws.9 However, if we are
to include the bribee within the purview of criminal liability, New
York Penal Law Section 180.05 will have to be enacted as well.10 Both
sections of the New York law became effective Sept. 1, 1967, and no
cases have been reported thus far. However, both sections restate two
provisions of former New York Penal Law Section 439, "dealing with
an intent or understanding that the employee's conduct in relation to
his employer's or principals affairs will be influenced."'1 The new law
does not carry over those provisions of former Section 489 which
"render a seller who gives a present to a purchaser and the purchasing
agent thereof guilty of a crime even in the absence of any intent or
12
agreement that the agent's conduct will be influenced."
An investigaticn of Section 439 is helpful in determining the scope
of the law, the frequency and type of litigation thereunder. One researcher found that only seven criminal cases involving the statute
have been litigated, giving emphasis to the notion that enforcement
in the general area is most difficult.13 More recently, North Carolina
had a case of first impression after having had a commercial bribery
14
statute on the books for fifty years.
The old New York statute has been applied more frequently than
similar statutes of other states and has been the primary target of discussion by commentators in the area. Generally, where a purchasing
agent is bribed, the contract will not be enforced against the buyer.15
9 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 180.00 (McKinney 1967) provides:
A person is guilty of commercial bribing when he confers, or offers to
confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent, or fiduciary without the
consent of the latter's employer or principal, with intent to influence
his conduct in relation to his employer's or principle's affairs.
10 N.Y. PENAL LA-w § 180.05 (McKinney 1967) states:
An employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of commercial bribe receiving
when, without the consent of his employer or principal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an
agreement that such benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his

employer's or principal's affairs.

"Ch. 409, § 439, [1930J N.Y.
12 Id.

PENAL LAw

1909 (repealed 1967).

13 See Note, Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848, 853 (1960).

14 State v. Brewer, 258 N.C. 533, 129 S.E.2d 262 (1963); 1 A.L.R.Srd 1323
(1965).

15 Shemin v. A. Black & Co., 32 Misc. 2d 1046, 255 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1962),

reversed in part on other grounds, 19 App. Div.2d 596, 240 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963),

motion denied, 14 N.Y.2d 727, 250 N.Y.S.2d 72, 199 N.E. 2d 169 (1964), -motion
granted, 199 N.E.2d 515, 250 N.Y.S.2d 438 (964);

Norton v. John T. Clark &

Son, 144 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1955), reversed and modified on other grounds, 2 App.
Div. 2d 875, 156 N.Y.S2d 233 (1956), appeal denied, 2 App. Div2d 966,159 N.Y.S.
2d 742 (1956), appeal dismissed, 2 N.Y.2d 853, 140 N.E.2d 917, 160 N.Y.S.2d
4 (1957); Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d 571 (1948); Kraus v. H.

Pactor & Co., 134 Misc. 247, 234 N.Y.S. 687 (1929).
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Kentucky has shown a tendency to honor this principle by common
law ruling.' In addition, the buyer may recover the bribe money from
either his agent or the briber;"' he may dismiss the unfaithful em19
ployee;' 8 and he may withhold remuneration for services rendered.
Since the passage of commercial bribery laws by several states, attempts have been made both to expand and restrict them. The Model
20
Penal Code Section 224.8 illustrates the ultimate conclusions. The

most important provision under newly enacted and proposed laws
is one which requires a conscious disregard of a known duty of
fidelity. 21 Previous laws, in certain instances, penalized parties to a
bribe regardless of their intent or agreement that the employee or
agent would be influenced by the bribe. New York Penal Law Section
180.00 expresses this by the phrase, "intent to influence his conduct."
The Model Penal Code does not, however, include a provision regarding the employer's knowledge of, or consent to the bribe. The effect of
this ommission is to completely disallow any benefits to be transferred
with the knowledge that the employee's behavior will be influenced.
This is in opposition to New York's statute which will allow bribes to
continue so long as the employer consents. 22 Perhaps it would be better
if bribery were made illegal regardless of the principal's knowledge
16 See Kessler v. lefferson Storage Co., 125 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1941).
17 Palmer v. Doull Miller Co., 233 F. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Donemar, Inc.
v. Molloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169 N.E. 610 (1929).
IsSears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kelley, 1 Misc 2d 624, 149 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup.
Ct. 1956).
19 Palmer v. Doull Miller Co., 233 F. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.8 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
(1) A person commits a misdemeanor if he solicits, accepts or agrees to
accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating or agreeing
to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject as:
(a) agent or employee of another;
(b) trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary;
(c) lawyer, physician, accountant, appraiser, or other professional
advisor or informant;
(d) officer, director, partner, manager or other participant in the direction of the affairs of an incorporated or unincorporated association; or
(e) arbitrator or other purportedly disinterested adjudicator or referee.
(2) A person who holds himself out to the public as being engaged
in the business of making disinterested selection, appraisal, or criticism of commodities or services commits a misdemeanor if he solicits,
accepts or agrees to accept any benefit to influence his selection, appraisal, or criticism.
(3) A person commits a misdemeanor if he confers, or offers or agrees
to confer, any benefit the acceptance of which would be criminal under
this section.
21 MODEL PENAL CODE § 233.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
22
Though this may not technically be called a bribe (in view of the employer's consent) the widespread economic results are the same, i.e., economic
waste which results in higher consumer prices and/or lower quality goods.
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and consent-this would aid in eliminating those bribes now considered to be accepted business practices.
As evidenced by the Model Penal Code provision, there is an attempt to broaden the categories of employer-employee, and principalagent to include any and all fiduciary-beneficiary relationships. This
extends the statute past the boundaries of business and into all relationships where monetary loss or gain has created a duty of fidelity. New
York's statute incorporates this term "fiduciary" while simultaneously
changing "principal's business" to "principal's affairs". 23 Both the
Model Penal Code and New York Penal Code broaden the scope of
fidelity-bound relationships while eliminating the penalization of persons giving or receiving gifts who are unaware of any betrayal.
The major problem in the enforcement of commercial bribery laws
is public apathy and the fact that many corrupt practices are considered ethically acceptable and an inevitable cost of doing business.
Though many employers do not approve of it, they realize its necessity
in maintaining competitive equality. Aside from the moral question
presented, the American public suffers definite economic deprivation
as a result of large amounts of money added as a cost of business.
Bribery is rampant because people desire economic gain. When,
for example, a seller's products are of poor quality, or his ineptness in
management results in high manufacturing costs, he may find he cannot compete with good quality lower priced goods. Proponents of the
competitive system hope for just this situation-the desire being that
this seller will find better methods of production, improve his
managerial techniques, raise the quality of his goods, and ultimately
lower his prices. Too often, however, this seller will simply bribe his
way into the market with inferior, high-priced goods.
A bribe, if it continues, also has the effect of isolating a buyer
from an open, competitive market. The result, if bribes are widespread within a particular industry, is a depressurized market which
succumbs to the increasing practice of paying bribe money to obtain
buyers. The cost of the goods is increased by at least the amount of
the bribe; the price of the goods increases, and the consumer ultimately absorbs the cost. Thus, in order to preserve our economic
system and safeguard innocent beneficiaries from a breach of trust by
those in a fiduciary capacity, criminal statutory provisions are
necessary.
It is readily agreed that commercial bribery laws, due to their lack
of enforcement, have not been effective deterrents to crime. A
2

3N.Y. PENAL LAw § 180.00 (McKinney 1967).
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bribe is difficult to detect and because those parties to it are generally
the only persons involved, there is no innocent third part to divulge
incriminating evidence. This problem has been handled by several
states by statutes (1) granting criminal immunity to persons compelled
to testify,24 or (2) granting immunity to the first participant in the
bribe to supply evidence which tends to convict the other partiMassachusetts law which grants
cipants.2 5 Even more effective is 2the
0
immunity.
criminal
and
civil
both
Based on the foregoing, this author proposes the following statute:
(1). A person is guilty of commercial bribing when he confers, or
offers to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent, or fiduciary
with or without the consent of the latter's employer or principal, with
intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or
27
principal's affairs.
(2). An employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of commercial bribe
receiving when, with or without consent of his employer or principal,
he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person
upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence
2
his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs. 3
(3). (a) In any prosecution or any investigation by an examining
court or grand jury under (1) or (2), no witness shall be granted
exemption from testifying on the grounds that his testimony may incriminate himself. (b) No testimony given in the proceedings stated in
subsection (a) shall be used against the testifying witness in any
29
civil or criminal proceedings.
(4). The first person committing an offense within the purview of
(1) or (2) or both, who shall report the facts, under oath, and who
shall give evidence tending to convict any other person charged with
an offense under this section shall be granted full immunity from
liability in any civil or criminal proceedings.8 0
E. Robert Goebel
24
25

IowA CODE § 741.4 (1958): Micr. CoM. Aws § 750.125 (1948).
REV. STAT. § 14.73 (1950); MiCH. CouP. LAws § 750.125 (1948);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-89 (1951).
26
2 MAss, GEN. LAws AN. ch. 271 § 39 (1956).
7N.Y. PEAL LAw § 180.00 (McKinney 1967).
2
8N.Y. PEmAL LAw § 180.05 (McKinney 1967).
29
MICH. Comp. LAws § 750.125 (1931).
LA.

30 Id.

